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Abstract In this study, we examine the effects of stringent insider trading laws’ enforcement, 
institutions and stock market development on international equity portfolio allocation using 
data from 44 countries over the period 2001-2015. Our results suggest that stringent insider 
trading laws and their enforcement exert a positive and significant impact on international 
portfolio investment allocation. Further analysis indicates that the interaction between a 
country’s institutional quality, stock market development and enforcement of insider trading 
laws have a positive and significant effect on international equity portfolio allocation. The 
findings of this study have implications for the design of portfolio investment trading strategies 
and contribute to the literature on foreign equity investment decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most significant developments in the international financial environment over the 
past three decades is the gradual and systematic removal of investment restrictions and 
institutional constraints that impede capital flows in both emerging and developed countries 
(see French and Poterba 1991; Bekaert and Harvey 2003). Increasingly, economists and policy 
makers have realised that financial liberalisation and institutional reforms play a pivotal role in 
attracting foreign investment inflows and consequently facilitate economic growth. Scholars 
also contend that cross-border capital inflows provide a means to overcome capital shortages 
(Grubel 1968; Du et al. 2016). For example, Papaioannou (2009) points out that capital inflows 
generated by countries are regarded by the market as a vote of confidence and a validation of 
government policies. 
While prior studies have examined the economic determinants and benefits of foreign 
equity portfolio allocation, relatively less empirical work exists on how the interaction between 
insider trading laws enforcement and institutions may influence international portfolio 
investments (see So and Tse 2001; Papaioannou 2009; Phengpis and Swanson 2011; Chiou and 
Lee 2013; Okada 2013). Notwithstanding countries enacting insider trading laws, existing 
studies show that corporate insiders continue to trade on price-sensitive non-public information 
(Kryzanowski and Lazrak 2011; Milian 2016; Tartaroglu and Imhof 2017). 
It is pertinent to point out that the notable contributions by Beny (2007) and 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)1 have focused on the effects of insider trading laws and their 
enforcement on stock market performance and cost of capital. However, global capital flows 
across countries depend and react to the diverse institutions, legal framework and economic 
characteristics in the host country in which firms do their business (Miletkov, Poulsen and 
                                                          
1 Beny (2007) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) looked at the effects of insider trading laws, their 
enforcement on performance, cost of capital and portfolio investment and neglect the interaction between insider 
trading laws’ enforcement, institutional quality and levels of stock market development. 
3 
 
Wintoki 2017). Globerman and Shapiro (2003); La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) and Chiyachantana 
et al. (2004) support this view and contend that institutional environment, capital market depth 
and the strength of the corporate governance system in the host country are not only important 
in attracting foreign investments but are also central to the design of trading strategies and 
efficiency of firms. Yet prior empirical efforts have not addressed the effects of institutions on 
portfolio investment holistically and we have little understanding regarding the combined 
effects of the interaction between the insider trading laws enforcement, and infrastructure 
development2 on international equity portfolio allocation. The above is against the backdrop 
that Filatochev et al. (2013) emphasize, which is that institutional characteristics interact on 
both a complementary and substitutable basis, and the effect of institutions should be evaluated 
with other factors to provide an inclusive and full account of their effects. This argument is 
broadly consistent with institutional theory, which posits that the combination of formal rules, 
their enforcement and governance quality are important in shaping the behaviour and 
investment strategies of firms (North 1991; Scott 1995). We contend that the level and quality 
of institutions and the insider trading law enforcement may jointly affect investors’ willingness 
to participate in equity markets and therefore it is imperative the combined effects are 
investigated to improve our understanding on whether they affect foreign equity portfolio 
allocation.  
In this study, we shed light on the effects of insider trading laws enforcement and their 
interactions with institutional quality and stock market development on foreign equity portfolio 
allocation, which previous literature has ignored. Our argument here is that the level of stock 
market development, institutions and insider trading laws enforcement may interact to 
engender confidence in the market and influence the willingness of portfolio investors to 
allocate equity investments to countries that have quality infrastructure and a good enforcement 
                                                          
2 A proxy for institutional quality and stock market development (Fernandes and Ferreira 2009) 
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regime. This is because scholars such as Leland (1992), Brockman and Chung (2002); 
Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) and Du et al. (2016) argue that good institutions reduce 
transaction costs, information asymmetry and adverse selection risks, while enforcement 
increases investors’ participation in equity markets, liquidity and efficient corporate behaviour. 
For example, La Porta et al. (1998) showed that countries with weak institutions have narrow 
capital markets due to low participation by outside investors. Therefore, we argue that any 
attempt to deeply understand international portfolio allocation should explore not only insider 
trading laws enforcement but also the joint effect of enforcement, stock market development 
and institutional quality. This paper fills this gap and extends the literature on the effects of 
inside trading laws enforcement, levels of capital markets development, and institutional 
quality on international equity portfolio investment inflows. We do so by using panel OLS 
regression analysis on the data of 44 bilateral countries over the period from 2001-2015. We 
further employ dynamic generalized methods of moments (GMM) to increase the robustness 
of our results. 
We find evidence to suggest that stringent insider trading laws and their enforcement 
exert a positive and significant impact on foreign equity portfolio allocation. Regarding the 
effects of interaction between the level of enforcement, institutional quality and stock market 
development, we find that the interaction between the enforcement of insider trading laws, 
institutional quality and stock market development exerts a significant influence on 
international portfolio investment allocation.  
The study contributes to the literature in several important ways:  First, the paper 
extends prior literature on the determinants of international portfolio investment. In particular, 
our study addresses gaps in prior empirical research by highlighting the effects of interactions 
between stringent insider law enforcement, institutions and stock market development and how 
they influence the inflows of international equity portfolio investments. Examining the joint 
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effect of host country institutions, stock market development and insider trading laws 
enforcement on portfolio investment is important for designing trading strategies to minimise 
information risk and transaction costs, and increase stock market participation by foreign equity 
investors.  Second, the study provides an enhanced understanding by employing a large data 
set involving 44 countries with more statistical power, compared to prior studies. Employing a 
proxy for enforcement following the work of Beny (2007), we show that the enforcement of 
insider trading laws, institutional quality and level of stock market development jointly 
influence foreign equity investors’ decisions to enter foreign markets. Taken together and 
relying on the institutional theory, our findings argue that institutions matter, underscoring the 
importance of understanding the pivotal role of the host country’s institutional environment in 
shaping the success of international portfolio strategies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
formulates hypotheses in respect of the effects of insider trading laws and institutions on 
international equity portfolio allocation. Section 3 provides a description of the data and 
methods used in this study. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results, and section 5 
presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1 Institutions and international equity portfolio allocation 
Existing literature offers both theoretical and empirical explanations of the factors that 
determine international equity portfolio allocation. These include transaction cost (Warnock 
2002); barriers to international investment (Errunza and Losq 1985); differences in investor 
protection, levels of transparency, and the corporate governance systems in the host country 
(La Porta et al. 1999; Dahlquist et al. 2003; Gelos and Wei 2005; Adegbite 2015). Others 
indicate that information asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors, and capital 
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market depth and risk associated with the host country institutional environment, have a 
bearing on the flow of international portfolio investment (Dahlquist and Robertson 2001; La 
Porta et al. 1998). It is argued that foreign investors not only face foreign exchange risk but 
also political risk in countries that exhibit policy instability, poor governance and weak 
institutions (Uche et al. 2016). For example, La Porta et al. (1998) note that corporate 
governance and institutional quality impact on risk and information costs associated with 
foreign investments. Furthermore, studies such as Kho et al. (2009) and Giannetti and Koskinen 
(2010) have rendered some support for the role played by the nature of corporate governance 
and institutional quality on foreign equity portfolio allocation in the host country. This above 
view is consistent with institutional theory explanations which argue that institutional contexts, 
i.e., the combination of formal and informal rules, and their enforcement are important in 
explaining the investment strategies of firms (North 1991; Scott 1995). Scott (2001) and 
Buckley et al. (2007) argue that the institutional and regulatory framework of the host economy 
can shape and determine the investment inflows into a country. Therefore any attempt to 
examine a firm’s investment strategy requires an understanding of the institutional framework 
of the countries within which firms operate. We therefore draw on institutional theory, which 
is defined by North (1990) as “the rules of the game” to ground this paper. 
At the empirical level, systematic research evidence points to the important role of 
institutions in foreign investments. For example, Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005) find 
that US funds allocate more investments to emerging countries with stronger accounting 
standards, shareholder rights and a legal framework. Similarly, Papaioannou (2009) shows that 
poor institutional quality and poor governance adversely affect foreign equity portfolio flow to 
developing and emerging countries. Djankov et al. (2008) concur, and argue that institutions 
that protect minority investors attract foreign equity portfolio inflows while poor corporate 
governance and weak institutions discourage portfolio investments. Moreover, Papaioannou 
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(2009) contends that poor legal and property rights in an institutional context affect 
international bank lending and investment inflow. Recent literature, such as Du et al. (2016), 
also suggests that financial liberalisation and globalisation have spurred cross-border 
investments across countries. However, Okada (2013) notes that the institutional environment 
tends to play a complementary role in international equity capital flows. Those who support 
this line of thinking argue that financial integration alone has little effect in attracting foreign 
equity capital into countries with poor institutional quality and weak governance (Gelos and 
Wei 2011). Alternatively, they suggest that differences in the quality of governance, levels of 
capital market development and institutions explain the reasons why some countries attract 
more equity capital inflows relative to other countries, even though those countries might have 
higher marginal returns. Overall, previous studies underscore the need for insider trading laws 
(Lee and Lu 2008), and the importance of institutions, corporate governance quality, insider 
trading laws enforcement, and capital market development as key drivers of foreign portfolio 
investments. Yet, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to how insider trading laws 
enforcement may interact with institutional quality and stock market development to affect 
portfolio investment. This is against the backdrop that investing directly in international equity 
markets entails unique risks, challenges, and costs (see Chiyachantana et al. 2004), which can 
be alleviated by the combination of institutional environment in which firms operate, level of 
laws’ enforcement and stock market development. Our paper is different from previous studies 
in that it focuses on the joint effects of these variables to provide a more holistic understanding 
of institutions and law enforcement, and their association may reduce transaction costs, 
information risks and improve stock market participation by investors in international markets. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
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Law and economics literature provides the pros and cons of insider trading.3 The economic 
argument suggests that restrictive insider trading laws and their enforcement can reduce 
adverse selection costs and enhance stock market liquidity. For example, Carlton and Fischel 
(1983) argue that insider trading laws alleviate agency conflict and also reduce intra-firm 
inefficiency. Further, such laws increase investors’ confidence in the market, reduce corporate 
plans’ interference, improve investment and welfare, and motivate institutional shareholders to 
monitor management, rather than seek to profit from insider trading (Uche et al. 2016).  
On the empirical front, recent studies document that foreign investors tend to increase 
their portfolio allocation in countries that have stringent insider trading laws and rigorously 
enforce them. For example, Beny (2007) finds that stringent insider trading laws and 
enforcement are positively associated with greater corporate valuation in common law 
countries. This suggests that restrictive insider trading laws and enforcement mitigate risk and 
cost. Therefore, it may be argued that foreign investors may devote more resources to collect 
information once they know there is a low probability of trading with insiders who would be 
unable to use their superior private knowledge. If restrictive insider trading laws and 
enforcement prevent the crowding-out effect, this makes stock prices more informationally 
efficient and increases the participation of foreign investors. Enforcement of insider trading 
laws may further reduce information asymmetries and encourage investments, and increase 
domestic stock market participation by foreign equity investors. Overall, it is argued that 
countries that have stringent insider trading laws will attract more foreign investors as this 
reduces controlling shareholders’ incentives to divert corporate value through trading on price-
sensitive, private information. Similarly, countries that enforce insider trading laws tend to 
                                                          
3 For papers on pros and cons on insider trading laws (see Damodaran and Liu 1993; Bebchuk and Fershtman 
1994; Agrawal and Jaffe 1995; Maug, 2002; Firth et al. 2011; Gangopadhyay et al. 2014). 
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attract more foreign equity investors as this serves as a deterrent to controlling shareholders. In 
the light of the above, we put forward the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Stringent insider trading laws (SITL) are positively associated with higher foreign equity 
portfolio allocation.  
H2:  Enforcement of insider trading laws (Enforce) relates to higher foreign equity portfolio 
allocation. 
 
The finance literature shows that the level of a country’s infrastructure development 
plays a significant role in international equity portfolio allocation. Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2009) suggest that both institutional quality and stock market development capture 
infrastructure development. The strength of institutions provides an indication of the health of 
the stock market and is a strong predictor of foreign equity portfolio allocation. Leland (1992); 
Brockman and Chung 2002) and Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) echo similar view and 
argue that improved regulatory quality and the rule of law provide confidence to increase stock 
market liquidity. However, an issue yet to be explored in the literature is whether stringent 
insider trading laws’ enforcement interacts with the level of a country’s level of infrastructure 
development to increase investors’ willingness to participate in equity markets. 
In this paper, we argue that insider trading laws enforcement interacts with 
infrastructure development to influence equity portfolio inflows. This is because institutional 
quality, stock market development and insider trading law enforcement may jointly engender 
confidence in the market and influence the willingness of portfolio investors to participate in 
equity investments across countries. This argument is in line with the views of Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman (2006); Beck and Levine (2005) and Leland (1992) who contend that good 
institutions, stock market development and insider trading laws’ enforcement, albeit separately, 
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may alleviate transaction costs, and information and adverse selection risks,  and engender 
confidence, resulting in higher investors’ equity market participation and liquidity. In the light 
of the above, we therefore put forward two exploratory hypotheses (representing proxies for a 
country’s infrastructural development) as follows: 
 
H3: The interaction between the level of insider trading law enforcement and institutional 
quality is positively related to foreign equity portfolio allocation. 
H4: The interaction between the level of insider trading law enforcement and stock market 
development is positively related to foreign equity portfolio allocation. 
 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data sources and measurement of variables 
Our dependent variable is foreign equity portfolio allocation for each country. We obtained 
annual standard bilateral country aggregated equity allocation data from the Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We use the 
annual bilateral CPIS dataset of 44 countries for the period from 2001-2015 to construct foreign 
portfolio allocation. The CPIS provides data on bilateral equity holdings for 76 stock markets. 
Following the standard data filtering (e.g., deleting countries with missing data, as well as 
inconsistent and extreme values of variables), we restricted our sample size to 44 out of the 45 
countries. This consists of the investable Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All 
Country Index, which accounts for about 95% of total assets and liabilities held by CPIS. The 
IMF requires all the participating countries to provide a breakdown of equity portfolio 
investment. We model foreign equity portfolio allocation as our dependent variable following 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The foreign equity portfolio allocation of country 𝑖 into country 
𝑗 is defined as:  
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Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the weight of foreign equity portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 into 
country 𝑗 for the year 𝑡, and 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 is foreign investors’ actual portfolio allocation in USD 
millions.  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
In our analysis, the main independent variables of interest are stringent insider trading laws 
(STIL) and enforcement of insider trading laws (Enforce). Following existing literature, we 
discuss and construct SITL and Enforce as follows.  
 
3.2.1 Stringent insider trading laws 
The stringent insider trading laws (SITL) is the aggregate of four elements: Laws preventing 
insiders from trading on price-sensitive private information; the country’s regulations 
preventing tippees (outsiders) from using the price-sensitive private information provided by 
corporate insiders; financial penalty suffered for violating insider trading laws; and whether 
insider trading is considered as a criminal offence. Following Beny (2007) we construct SITL 
across our sample countries. First, we assign a value equal to one if the insider trading laws 
make a corporate insider liable for providing price-sensitive private information to a tippee and 
otherwise zero. Second, we give a value equal to one if the country’s insider trading laws forbid 
the tippee from trading on price-sensitive private information provided by corporate insiders 
and otherwise zero. The third element considers the penalty for violating insider trading laws 
relative to the proceeds from the crime. We assign a value equal to one if the possible financial 
penalty for violating a country’s insider trading regulations is higher than the proceeds from 
the unlawful trading and otherwise zero. The final element considers whether insider trading 
 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
44
𝑗=1
)  (1)  
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is a criminal offence. We assign a value equal to one if the country’s insider trading regulations 
classify insider trading as a criminal activity and otherwise zero. 
The aggregate measure of SITL may be problematic, as a regression model with a 
discrete variable assumes a constant marginal effect for any increment in the discrete variable, 
which may be different in practice. Nevertheless, following existing studies (see Beny 2008; 
Brockman et al. 2014), SITL is suitable (even if there is a practical concern) as it captures the 
breadth of the insider trading prohibition and the expected criminal and monetary penalties for 
violating a country’s insider trading laws. 
 
3.2.2 Enforcement of insider trading laws 
A country can have stringent insider trading laws on the books but would rarely enforce them 
to deter potential illicit traders to enhance investor confidence. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) 
argue that regulations’ deterrent is a combined function of the substantive content of the law 
and the possibility that the law will be enforced. Countries have little systematic information 
on actual enforcement of insider trading laws. Following Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), 
Beny (2007), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), we construct a dummy variable Enforce 
which is equal to one if insider trading laws have been enforced once in a country by the year 
2000, and zero otherwise.4  
The fundamental Enforce data are from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who report the 
first time prosecution of insider traders in over 100 countries. The construction of the Enforce 
measure could undoubtedly be problematic as it does not offer enough intuition on the 
magnitude and frequency of enforcement or prosecution of insider traders. However, as in Beny 
(2008), it remains a good proxy with the understanding that if a country had once enforced the 
insider trading laws, there is high likelihood of the law being enforced again. 
                                                          
4 Our data begins from 2001 so we chose the year 2000 as the cut-off date. 
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3.3 Control variables 
In our panel regression analysis, we control for several time-varying country-specific 
characteristics shown in existing studies that influence portfolio allocation decisions of foreign 
investors. Country-specific factors such as direct and indirect barriers, country risk, and the 
level of financial and economic development, largely influence the ability and incentives of 
foreign investors to buy domestic equities. 
In spite of the benefits of international portfolio diversification through increased risk 
sharing, a body of research has shown that investors fail to exploit diversification benefits and 
allocate a relatively significant proportion of their investments to domestic equities. Fidora et 
al. (2007) and Chan et al. (2005) show that investors over-invest in their domestic market. We 
therefore use equity home bias (EHBIAS) to isolate its implications on international portfolio 
allocation before controlling for the possible effects of other factors on foreign investment 
flow. 
Foreign exchange risk affects international portfolio returns and therefore, the 
movement of foreign exchange would be a concern to foreign investors. Following Carrieri et 
al. (2006), we use real effective foreign exchange rate (REFER) to capture exchange rate 
volatility which directly affects international portfolio returns. Carrieri et al. (2006) argue that 
REFER is a better than nominal effective exchange rate because consumer price levels are 
mainly non-random. They also suggest that the use of real effective foreign exchange rate will 
capture the true effect of exchange rate risk arising from purchasing power parity. REFER is a 
three year moving average standard deviation of weighted REFER. We obtained data from the 
Bank of International Settlement (BIS).  
Foreign investors are generally concerned with the country-specific risk profile in terms 
of economic and financial risk. We use financial risk (FinRisk) and economic risk policy 
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(EconRisk) to control their effects on international portfolio investment decisions. We derived 
our data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Stock markets where transaction costs are lower will attract more equity portfolio flow. 
Solnik and McLeavey (2004) show that transaction costs reduce a portfolio’s expected returns. 
Investors tend to reduce their investments in countries with high transaction costs. We therefore 
use transaction cost (TRCT) to capture the important role it plays in international portfolio 
allocation. We obtained the data that are estimated and maintained by Elkins/McSherry (E/M) 
and are reported in the annual global stock market fact book of Standard and Poor’s. The E/M 
transaction cost is the average transaction cost in US dollars, obtained by aggregating three 
sub-components: commission, fees, and market impact. Foreign investors are more likely to 
invest in countries with lower transaction costs.  
Existing studies show that integrated markets attract foreign portfolio investment (see 
Chan et al. 2005). We use the log average of a country’s annual exports and imports scaled by 
GDP (LSMI) to capture stock market openness. 
Following Aggarwal et al. (2005) and La Porta et al. (1998), we use two measures to 
control for investor protection. International investors tend to invest in countries where strong 
shareholders’ rights and institutional quality exist. We employ the International Country Risk 
Guide’s (ICRG) rule of law (Law) index, ranging from 0 (highest potential risk) to 6 (lowest 
potential risk). The second measure we use is the ICRG corruption (Cor) index ranging from 
0 (highest risk) to 6 (lowest potential risk). 
We use Tobinq to capture the valuation effects of a country. It is conceivable that 
foreign investors will be attracted to countries with firms experiencing higher valuations. We 
measure Tobinq as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity 
and divided by the book value of corporate assets of country 𝑖. 
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We use GDP per capita growth rate (GDPPCG) to capture the level of economic 
development in attracting foreign equity investment. We obtained data from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. We expect investors to have high 
preference to invest in countries with high economic development.  
Foreign investors are likely to invest in countries that have developed stock markets. 
For instance, Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2006) show that foreign investors increase 
their investments in developed stock markets as a result of higher liquidity. We use market 
capitalization to GDP (MGDP) to control for the importance of a country’s stock market to the 
economy. Investors will invest in countries with developed stock markets which play a 
significant role in the economy. Levine and Zervos (1996) argue that developed stock markets 
play a significant role in mobilizing financial resources and risk diversification. We obtained 
data from WDI. The manner in which our dependent and independent variables are defined and 
measured is provided in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
This section begins with a brief analysis of the summary statistics of the variables. We 
subsequently discuss the results of the multivariate regression that accounts for the relationship 
between the enforcement of insider trading laws and international equity portfolio allocation. 
 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents a summary analysis of the annual country-level of the variables used in the 
study. Among the 44 sample countries, 23 are developed countries and 21 are emerging 
markets. Panel A presents averages of annual data for developed countries and panel B reports 
averages for emerging markets. There are a total of 660 annual country-level observations in 
44 countries, with an average relative foreign equity portfolio allocation across both developed 
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and emerging markets of 0.0233(median 0.0062). Developed countries on average attract 
0.0425 foreign equity portfolio allocations more than emerging markets. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 2 report a wide cross-country distribution in stringent insider 
trading laws (SITL) and enforcement (Enforce). Interestingly, developed countries have most 
stringent insider trading laws (2.9) relative to emerging markets (2.7). Similarly, developed 
countries on average have enforced insider trading laws (0.8) compared to emerging markets 
(0.6). Norway and Mexico have the least stringent insider trading laws.  
Models 4-11 present the control variables at the country level. Equity home bias 
(EHBIAS) ranges from an average of 3.32 in developed countries to 6.04 in emerging markets, 
indicating domestic investors in emerging countries overweight their local stock market 
compared to developed countries. Financial risk (FinRisk) varies largely between 24.27 in the 
United Kingdom to 46.5 in China. Transaction cost (TRCT) ranges from 88.02 basis points in 
the Philippines to 19.38 basis points in Japan. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 2 presents the cross-correlation coefficient matrix, highlighting the relationship between 
Port_Alloc, SITL, Enforce and other explanatory variables used in our analysis. In line with 
theoretical expectations, foreign portfolio allocation Port_Alloc, is positively and significantly 
correlated with SITL and Enforce. Interestingly, there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between SITL and Enforce. Several variables’ correlation coefficients show 
expected signs. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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4.3 Regression results 
This section examines whether cross-sectional and temporal differences in insider trading laws 
and enforcement have any varying impact on international equity portfolio flows. The above 
univariate analysis suggests a positive relationship between the enforcement of insider trading 
laws and foreign equity portfolio flows. To ensure the reliability of the observed relationship, 
we control for other factors that affect foreign equity portfolio allocation. In our analysis, we 
use a panel regression with Newey-West standard error correction method to arbitrarily correct 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Fixed effects uses within-country or firm changes 
to explain the dependent variable (see Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). In this study, our 
independent variables hardly change over time. Therefore, we use a random effects approach 
to address within-country correlation, as the control variables are uncorrelated with country-
specific effect. The random effects approach is mainly efficient because it uses both between 
and within cross-country variations in the dataset. Hausman’s (1978) test shows that the 
random effects model is preferred over fixed effects estimation.   
 
4.3.1 Insider trading laws, enforcement, and international portfolio allocation 
We proceed to formally test the relationship between insider trading laws, enforcement and 
international portfolio allocation. In Table 3, we present the panel OLS results from SITL and 
Enforce; all specifications include the control variables discussed in section 2.3 and capture 
country fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  
Equation (2) is estimated using foreign portfolio allocation (𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) and the results are 
reported in models 1 and 3 of Table 3 with stringent insider trading laws (𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡) as the key 
independent variable of interest. We find the coefficients for stringent insider trading laws 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2)  
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(SITL) to be positive (β = 0.194; t-statistics = 2.15), and (β = 0.177; t-statistics = 2.06) and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that merely enacting stringent 
insider trading laws provides a signal to investors that the country will protect them against 
insider trading, thereby leading to an increase in foreign equity investment. These results, 
although marginally significant in model 3, provide some support for hypothesis 1. However, 
this finding appears inconsistent with the dominant view in the literature, such as that of Dalko 
and Wang (2016), who argue that insider trading laws could be ineffective unless enforced.  
Equation (3) is estimated with enforcement of insider trading laws (Enforce) as the key 
independent variable of interest and we report the result in models 2 and 4. 
The results indicate that Enforce has a positive and statistically significant influence on 
international portfolio investment inflows at the 1% level. The coefficients for Enforce: (β = 
0.819; t-statistic = 9.74) and (β = 0.612; t-statistics = 7.63) reported in models 2 and 4 show 
that countries that enforce insider trading laws tend to attract more foreign equity investors. 
Further, after controlling for EHBIAS in model 4, Enforce remains positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Our results therefore support hypothesis 2. This is consistent with 
the insider trading literature, which suggests that the enforcement of insider trading laws 
reduces risk associated with investment, and encourages foreign investors to allocate more 
investment to countries that enforce those laws. For example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) 
show that the introduction of insider trading laws has no impact on the cost of equity capital 
but rather its enforcement reduces cost of equity capital, implying that enforcement may lead 
to abundance of capital and inflows of equity portfolio investments. 
The results demonstrate the extent of foreign investors’ concern about the integrity of 
the stock market. Countries that have stringent insider trading laws but fail to prosecute insiders 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3)  
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who trade on price-sensitive non-public information suffer from lack of market reliability and 
confidence, and the inability to attract foreign investors. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The control variables mainly exhibit the expected signs and are statistically significant 
as reported in Table 3 (models 1-4). The coefficient on EHBIAS is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in models 3 and 4. This is consistent with results reported in Thapa 
and Poshakwale (2010). All the variables that capture the riskiness of a country are negatively 
related to international equity portfolio allocation. For instance, REFER, FinRisk EconRisk, 
TRCT, and Cor have a negative and statistically significant association with international equity 
portfolio allocation. We find LSMI, Law, Tobinq, GDPPCG and MGDP which mainly capture 
the level of integration, performance of firms, economic growth and the level of stock market 
development, to have a positive and significant association with international portfolio 
allocation.  
 
4.3.2 Enforcement, institutions and the stock market development 
To find out whether the interaction between the enforcement of insider trading laws, quality of 
institutions and the level of stock market development increase the portfolio investment 
inflows, we carried out an analysis using the interaction of enforcement with proxies 
representing quality institutions (INS) and stock market development (SMD). The extent to 
which country institutional quality protects minority investors is proxied by World Bank 
Governance Indicator (WBGI) (which captures good governance) and the investor protection 
(InvPro) measure from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Furthermore, we 
examine the extent to which foreign investors react to the enforcement of insider trading laws 
and the degree of the country stock market development. We use stock value traded to GDP 
20 
 
(TRGDP) and Turnover ratio (Turn), measured as stock value traded divided by market 
capitalisation, to capture the level of stock market development. Our model specifications for 
the interactive variables are given below: 
 
 Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results of the interactions between enforcement 
and institutional quality. We find positive and significant coefficients for interactive variables: 
Enforce x WBGI (β =0.882; 𝑝 < 0.01) and Enforce x InvPro (β =0.490; 𝑝 < 0.01). The 
corresponding marginal effects are 0.472 and 0.268 in models 1 and 2 respectively, thus 
suggesting that enforcement of insider trading laws works in tandem with the quality of 
institutions to influence portfolio investment inflows. The positive coefficient on Enforce in 
Models 1 and 2 indicates that the quality of institutions appears to be an important element of 
enforcement and its sustainability. Foreign investors prefer to invest in equities of countries 
that enforce insider trading laws, coupled with good institutions. Hypothesis 3 is therefore 
supported.    
In Models 3 and 4 of Table 4, we examine the effects of interaction between 
enforcement and stock market development in attracting foreign equity portfolio flows. 
Countries that have developed stock markets experience stock prices that are more informative 
and have lower information asymmetry. Foreign investors allocate more equity investment to 
countries that have developed stock markets as a result of higher liquidity and lower transaction 
cost. Intuitively, enforcement of SITL and developed stock markets should have a pronounced 
combined effect in attracting foreign equity portfolio flow. The coefficients of interactions 
 
𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(4)  
 
𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5)  
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between enforcement and stock market development in models 3 and 4: Enforce×TRGDP (β 
= 0.577; 𝑝 < 0.01) and Enforce×Turn (β = 0.228; 𝑝 < 0.01) are positive and significant. The 
marginal effects of the interaction between enforcement and stock market development are 
0.236 and 0.354 in models 4 and 5 respectively. The results suggest that enforcement of insider 
trading laws and stock market development have a positive and statistically significant joint 
effect in attracting international equity portfolio flows. The results highlight the 
complementary roles that insider trading laws’ enforcement, institutional quality and stock 
market development play in attracting foreign equity portfolio investments across countries. 
Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported. 
 
      [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.3 Dynamic generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimation 
To address the issue of endogeneity, we use dynamic panel data estimation (Arellano and Bover 
1995) by including the first difference of foreign equity portfolio allocation as an explanatory 
variable. However, since in GMM, the first differenced foreign equity portfolio allocation is 
used as an instrument, we lose an observation. In addition to addressing the issue of reverse 
causality, the dynamic GMM model also takes account of unobservable heterogeneity (see 
Wintoki et al. 2012).5 Once again, four specifications of the equation are estimated for SITL 
and Enforce. We estimated the dynamic GMM using the following equation. All specifications 
include control variables, discussed in section 2, and capture country fixed effects (𝛼𝑗) and 
year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡).  
                                                          
5 The dynamic GMM estimation is appropriate when time waves are smaller and the panels are larger. Thus, the 
method is suitable for our data type as our sample is comprised of 15 years from 44 countries (panels). 
 𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6)  
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Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the weight of foreign equity portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 into 
country 𝑗 for the year 𝑡. 𝑋 contains the SITL and Enforce variables and 𝑍 contains the control 
variables. Employing lagged foreign equity portfolio allocation, SITL and Enforce variables 
help to perform two things. The first is to examine the impact of stringent insider trading laws 
and enforcement using different sets of assumptions from Tables 3 and 4. Second, it enables 
us to use it as an alternative dynamic panel as it does not rely on instruments. 
The results are presented in Table 5. All coefficients of the measures of SITL in models 
(1-2) and Enforce in models (3-4) are significant with expected signs, supporting the view that 
stringent insider trading laws and enforcement exert a positive influence on foreign equity 
portfolio allocation. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a sample of 44 countries to investigate the impact of insider trading laws’ 
enforcement and their interaction with the level of institutional quality and stock market 
development on foreign equity portfolio allocation. Prior studies have ignored the combined 
effects of insider trading laws’ enforcement, institutional quality and stock market development 
on international portfolio investments. Yet research evidence suggests that cross-border capital 
flows across countries depend on and react to differences in institutions, legal regimes and 
capital market depth in the host country in which firms do their business (Miletkov et al. 2017). 
More importantly, Filatochev et al. (2013) note that institutional characteristics interact with 
each other on both complementary and substitutable bases and, in order to fully understand the 
effects of institutions, researchers should evaluate the role of institutions holistically. In 
response, this paper has examined the effects of insider trading law enforcement, and its 
interaction with the level of institutional quality and stock market development. Indeed, this 
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study constitutes one of the first attempts to examine the implications of institutions on foreign 
equity portfolio investment inflows across countries. We find that stringent insider trading laws 
and their enforcement exert a positive and significant impact on international portfolio 
investment allocation. Regarding the effects of interaction between the level of enforcement, 
institutional quality and stock market development, we find that the interactions between the 
enforcement of insider trading laws, institutional quality and stock market development exert 
a significant influence on international portfolio investment allocation. It is pertinent to point 
out that the law, economics and finance literature all provide contentious debate with regard to 
the pros and cons of insider trading laws, with inconclusive results thus far. Our results provide 
evidence that countries that enact insider trading laws and enforce them, leads to an increase 
in foreign equity portfolio flows across countries. Providing implications for institutional 
theory, our findings demonstrate that institutional characteristics interact complementarily to 
attract equity portfolio investment, suggesting that the institutional environment appears 
critical to foreign firms’ investment strategies and portfolio allocation decisions.  
Our findings have important implications for policy makers and regulators. For 
instance, while enacting stringent insider trading laws provides a signal to foreign portfolio 
investors, their enforcement leads to an unequivocal increase in portfolio investments in the 
host country. Furthermore, our results imply that enforcement of insider trading laws operates 
on a complementary basis with the level of stock market development and institutional quality. 
Therefore investors should not only pay attention to the enactment and enforcement of insider 
trading laws, but should also consider the stock market depth and the quality of a country’s 
institutions to ensure the sustainability of portfolio investment inflows. This is because 
strengthening insider trading laws, providing for increased enforcement, institutional quality 
and stock market depth, tends to promote good governance, and enhance market integrity and 
investor confidence, thereby leading to high capital inflows. The implication of the results of 
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this study for emerging and developing countries is particularly important. We suggest that, in 
their quest to attract foreign equity capital and increase economic growth, emerging countries 
should reform and restructure their governance systems to provide good institutions for 
potential foreign investors to increase their investments in these countries. 
 
25 
 
References 
 
Adegbite E (2015) Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and 
peculiarities. Int Bus Rev 24:319–330 
Aggarwal R, Klapper L, Wysocki PD (2005) Portfolio preferences of foreign institutional 
investors. J Bank Finan 29:2919–2946 
Agrawal A, Jaffe J (1995) Does section 16b deter insider trading by target managers? J  Financ 
Econ 39:295–319 
Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. J Econometrics 68:29–51. 
Bebchuk L, Fershtman C (1994) Insider trading and the managerial choice among risky 
projects. J Financ Quant Anal 29: 1–14 
Beck T, Levine R (2005) Legal institutions and financial development. In Claude Menard and 
Mary Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics. The Netherlands: Springer 
Press 
Bekaert G, Harvey CR (2003) Emerging markets finance. J Empir Finan 10:3–55 
Beny LN (2007) Insider trading laws and stock markets around the world: An empirical 
contribution to the theoretical law and economics debate. J Corp Law 32:237–300 
Beny LN (2008) Do investors in controlled firms value insider trading laws? International 
evidence. J Law Econ Pol Law 4:267–310. 
Bhattacharya U, Daouk H (2002) The world price of insider trading.  J Finan 57:75–108. 
Brockman P, Chung DY (2002) Investor protection and firm liquidity. J Finan 58: 921–938 
Brockman P, Tresl D, Unlu E (2014) The impact of insider trading laws on dividend payout 
policy. J Corp Finan 29:263–287 
Buckley PJ, Clegg LJ, Cross AR, Liu X, Voss H, Zheng P (2007) The Determinants of Chinese 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment. J Int Bus Stud 38:499–518 
Carlton D, Fischel D (1983) The regulation of insider trading. Stanf Law Rev 35: 857–857 
Carrieri F, Errunza V, Majerbi B (2006) Does emerging market exchange risk affect 
global equity prices. J Financ Quant Anal 41:511–540 
Chan K, Covrig V, Ng L (2005) What determines the domestic bias and foreign bias? Evidence 
from mutual fund equity allocations worldwide. J Finan 60:1495–1534 
Chiou P, Lee CF (2013) Do investors still benefit from culturally home-biased diversification? 
An empirical study of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Rev Quant Finan Acc 40:341–381 
26 
 
Chiyachantana CN, Jain PK, Jiang C, Wood RA (2004) International evidence on institutional 
trading behaviour and price impact. J Finan 59:869–898 
Claessens S, Klingebiel D, Schmukler SL (2006) Stock market development and 
internationalization: Do economic fundamentals spur both similarly? J Empir Finan 
13:316–350 
Coles JL, Daniel ND, Naveen L (2008) Boards: Does one size fit all? J Financ Econ 87:329-
356. 
Cooper IA, Kaplanis E (1986) Costs to cross-border investment and international equity market 
equilibrium. In: Edwards, A. (Ed.), Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Dahlquist M, Pinkowitz L, Stulz RM, Williamson R (2003) Corporate governance and the 
home bias. J Financ Quant Anal 38:87–110  
Dahlquist M, Robertsson G (2001) Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors and firm 
characteristics. J Financ Econ 59:413–440. 
Dalko V, Wang MH (2016) Why is insider trading law ineffective? Three antitrust suggestions. 
Stud Econ Finan 33:704–715 
Damodaran A, Liu C (1993) Insider trading as a signal of private information. Rev Financ Stud 
6:79–119  
Djankov S, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2008) The law and economics of self-
dealing. J Financ Econ 88:430–465 
Du M, Boateng A, Newton D (2016) The impact of state ownership, formal institutions and 
resource seeking on acquirers’ returns of Chinese M&A. Rev Quant Finan Acc 47:159–
178 
Eleswarapu VR, Venkataraman K (2006) The impact of legal and political institutions on 
equity trading costs: A cross-country analysis. Rev Financ Stud 19:1081–1111 
Errunza V, Losq E (1985) International asset pricing and mild segmentation: Theory and test. 
J Finan 40:105–124. 
Fernandes N, Ferreira MA (2009) Insider trading laws and stock price informativeness. Rev 
Financ Stud 22:1845–1887 
Fidora M, Fratzscher M, Thimann C (2007) Home bias in global bond and equity markets; The 
role of real exchange rate volatility. J Int Money Finan 26:631–655 
Filatochev I, Jackson G, Nakajima C (2013) Corporate governance and national institutions: A 
review and emerging research agenda. Asia Pac J Manag 30:965–986 
27 
 
Firth M, Leung TY, Rui OM (2011) Insider trading in Hong Kong: test of stock returns and 
trading frequency. Rev Pac Basin Financ Mark Polic 14:505–533 
French K, Poterba J (1991) Investor diversification and international equity markets. Am Econ 
Rev 81: 222–226 
Gangopadhyay P, Yook, KC, Shin Y (2014) Insider trading and firm-specific return volatility. 
Rev Quant Finan Acc 43:1–19 
Gelos RG, Wei SJ (2005) Transparency and international portfolio holdings. J Finan 60:2987–
3020 
Gelos RG, Wei SJ (2011) International Mutual Funds, Capital Flow Volatility, and Contagion 
- A Survey. IMF Working Paper No. 11/92 
Giannetti M, Koskinen Y (2010) Investor protection, equity returns and financial globalization. 
J Financ Quant Anal 45:135–168 
Globerman S, Shapiro D (2003) Governance infrastructure and US foreign direct investment. 
J Int Bus Stud 3:19–39 
Grubel HG (1968) Internationally diversified portfolios. Am Econ Rev 58:1299–1314 
Hausman JA (1978) Specification test in econometrics. Econometrica 46:1251–1271 
Kho BC, Stulz RM, Warnock FE (2009) Financial globalization, governance, and the evolution 
of home bias. J Account Res 47:597–635 
Kryzanowski L, Lazrak S (2011) Informed traders of cross-listed shares trade more in the 
domestic market around earnings releases. Rev Quant Finan Acc 36:1-31 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1998) Law and Finance. J Political Econ 
106:1113–1155 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1999) The Quality of Government. J 
Law Econ Organ 15:222–279 
Lee CJ, Lu Z (2008) Trading on inside information when there may be tippees. Rev Quant 
Finan Acc 31:241–260  
Leland H (1992) Insider trading: Should it be prohibited? J Political Econ 100:859–887 
Levine R, Zervos S (1996) Stock Market Development and Economic Growth. World Bank 
Econ Rev 10:323–340 
Maug E (2002) Insider trading legislation and corporate governance. Eur Econ Rev 46:1569–
1597 
Miletkov MK, Poulsen AB, Wintoki MB (2017) Foreign independent directors and the quality 
of legal institutions. J Int Bus Stud 48:267–292 
28 
 
Milian JA (2016) Insider sales based on short-term earnings information. Rev Quant Finan Acc 
47:109–128 
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
North DC (1991) Institutions. J Econ Perspectives 5:97–112 
Okada K (2013) The interaction of effects of financial openness and institutions on 
international capital flow. J Macroecon 35:131–143 
Papaioannou E (2009) What drives international financial flows? Politics, Institutions and other 
Determinants. J Dev Econ 88:269–281 
Phengpis C, Swanson P (2011) Optimization, cointegration and diversification gains from 
international portfolios: an out-of-sample analysis. Rev Quant Finan Acc 36:269–286 
Scott WR (1995) Institutions and organisations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Scott WR (2001) Institutions and organisations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
So RW, Tse Y (2001) A note on international portfolio diversification with short selling. Rev 
Quant Finan Acc 16:311–321 
Solnik B, McLeavey D (2004) International Investments, Fifth Edition, Boston: Pearson 
Addison Wesley 
Tartaroglu S, Imhof M (2017) Insider trading and response to earnings announcements: the 
impact of accelerated disclosure requirements. Rev Quant Finan Acc 49:315–336 
Thapa C, Poshakwale SS (2010) International equity portfolio allocations and transaction cost. 
J Bank Finan 34:2627–2638 
Uche C, Adegbite E, Jones M (2016) Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria: An 
accountability perspective. Account Forum 40:78–88 
Warnock FE (2002) Home bias and high turnover reconsidered. J Int Money Finan 21:795–
805 
Wintoki MB, Linck JS, Netter J (2012) Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate 
governance. J Financ Econ 105:581–606 
Zimring FE, Hawkins G (1973) Deterrence; The legal threat in crime control, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
 
29 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
Note: Port_Alloc is portfolio allocation which is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡); SITL is stringent 
insider trading laws index that ranges between 1 (least stringent) and 4 (most stringent); Enforce is the enforcement of insider trading law which is a dummy variable equal to 
one if insider trading law has been enforced at least once by 2000, and zero otherwise; EHBIAS is equity home bias and is calculated as the log value of the share of domestic 
investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative to the country's world market capitalization weight; REFER is the three year moving average standard 
deviation of weighted real effective foreign exchange rate; FinRisk is the financial risk rating index of a country; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a 
country; TRCT is the measure of average transaction cost in basis points and is divided by 100; LSMI is a measure of market integration measured as the ratio of a country's 
annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; Law represents the rule of law rating index of a country; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities 
plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of corporate assets of country  𝑖; GDPPCG is gross domestic product per capita growth rate; MGDP is market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP; Cor corruption level prevailing in the country. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Panel A. Developed markets 
Country Port_Alloc SITL Enforce EHBIAS 
REFER 
(%) 
FinRisk 
(0-50) 
EconRisk 
(0-50) 
TRCT 
(Basis points) 
LSMI 
(% of GDP) 
Law 
(0-6) 
Tobinq 
GDPPCG 
(%) 
MGDP 
(% of GDP) 
Cor 
(0-6) 
Australia 0.0116 3 1 3.46 7.84 36.09 29.13 31.31 40.83 5.81 5.83 1.46 119.16 4.667 
Austria 0.0124 2 0 4.18 2.37 38.43 33.65 30.47 101.49 5.85 5.35 0.87 28.95 4.842 
Belgium 0.0249 3 1 3.32 2.71 27.78 42.97 28.16 153.17 4.72 5.09 0.77 65.83 3.817 
Canada 0.0251 4 1 2.81 4.26 29.51 41.84 30.28 70.33 5.85 5.67 0.94 114.47 4.854 
Denmark 0.0124 3 1 4.22 2.59 41.92 43.53 32.04 124.87 5.68 3.72 0.50 63.31 5.267 
Finland 0.0082 3 1 4.15 2.36 37.21 45.22 37.72 55.01 5.85 6.71 0.80 98.62 5.552 
France 0.0869 4 1 2.62 2.73 30.69 34.92 24.74 78.37 4.62 5.59 0.54 80.67 3.238 
Germany 0.0831 3 1 2.19 3.68 26.22 36.07 25.65 53.34 4.55 5.42 1.20 45.71 4.325 
Greece 0.0034 2 1 4.72 5.37 32.76 34.77 54.34 78.38 3.55 5.77 -0.10 51.91 2.775 
Hong Kong 0.0268 3 1 2.87 2.32 41.38 43.84 39.22 362.92 4.66 3.69 3.10 421.17 3.817 
Ireland 0.0568 3 0 2.84 4.69 35.59 41.85 31.24 161.14 5.85 6.13 2.92 46.77 3.288 
Israel 0.0017 4 1 4.68 3.72 31.27 36.16 37.36 76.03 5.15 4.47 1.39 84.72 3.075 
Italy 0.0416 3 1 2.84 2.38 31.76 35.05 29.15 52.75 3.79 5.22 -0.41 37.54 2.467 
Japan 0.1048 2 1 1.73 7.45 43.47 36.28 19.38 26.94 4.85 1.29 0.76 77.97 3.258 
Netherlands 0.0518 3 1 2.31 2.24 29.08 41.93 28.45 132.82 5.97 6.12 0.72 91.33 5.083 
New Zealand 0.0014 3 0 5.77 6.93 26.5 27.89 34.58 59.34 5.45 6.22 1.38 36.38 5.233 
Norway 0.0183 1 1 3.87 5.77 44.74 44.62 30.21 71.45 5.55 4.41 0.62 55.66 5.462 
30 
 
Portugal 0.0056 3 0 5.28 2.35 34.62 34.63 31.83 67.27 5.05 5.02 0.16 39.39 3.637 
Spain 0.0195 3 1 3.09 4.80 36.77 38.29 46.82 56.87 4.66 6.24 0.51 86.73 3.858 
Sweden 0.0137 3 1 3.75 4.78 28.42 44.64 28.62 89.37 5.98 3.48 1.45 104.08 5.192 
Switzerland 0.0385 3 1 3.11 3.34 45.24 44.93 27.16 88.85 4.75 5.21 0.79 229.24 4.163 
United Kingdom 0.1121 3 1 2.03 4.67 24.27 34.08 50.02 57.08 5.36 6.04 1.06 128.47 4.171 
United States 
 
Mean 
0.2259 
 
0.0427 
4 
 
3 
1 
 
0.8 
0.65 
 
3.32 
4.35 
 
4.07 
30.56 
 
34.09 
27.82 
 
38.01 
21.73 
 
32.63 
25.46 
 
90.61 
4.83 
 
5.14 
6.53 
 
5.17 
0.94 
 
0.97 
124.09 
 
97.05 
4.033 
 
4.177 
 
Panel B. Emerging markets 
Country Port_Alloc Insider Enforce EHBIAS 
REFER 
(%) 
FinRisk 
(0-50) 
EconRisk 
(0-50) 
TRCT 
(Basis points) 
LSMI 
(% of GDP) 
Law 
(0-6) 
Tobinq 
GDPPCG 
(%) 
MGDP 
(% of GDP) 
Cor 
(0-6) 
Argentina 0.0008 3 1 6.62 11.32 31.15 32.43 67.98 40.41 3.21 5.76 1.87 38.67 2.608 
Brazil 0.0006 2 1 5.34 13.64 32.63 34.98 46.06 25.81 2.33 5.01 1.75 54.96 2.313 
Bulgaria 0.0003 2 0 9.59 5.71 32.31 31.08 60.21 116.48 3.89 5.25 4.42 17.52 2.521 
Chile 0.0025 3 1 5.33 6.53 25.74 40.14 NA 69.21 4.85 0.21 3.09 107.1 3.496 
China 0.0083 3 0 3.15 5.87 46.53 37.37 46.58 58.66 3.93 4.18 9.07 69.07 1.854 
Czech Rep 0.0009 3 1 6.44 5.75 31.03 36.91 56.37 58.66 5.15 3.33 2.50 25.33 3.146 
Egypt 0.0002 3 0 7.27 8.66 33.46 34.54 68.15 93.56 3.92 5.39 2.12 55.67 2.246 
Hungary 0.0031 3 1 6.98 6.32 35.64 34.87 51.24 146.36 4.34 0.92 2.27 24.53 3.467 
India 0.0006 2 1 4.76 5.13 37.38 33.53 59.06 39.94 3.78 2.73 5.75 68.12 2.021 
Indonesia 0.0003 2 1 6.95 12.36 24.54 36.83 65.32 56.92 2.92 -1.81 3.94 30.03 2.088 
Korea 0.0034 4 1 4.56 5.83 34.19 41.64 55.05 82.12 4.76 -0.72 3.39 37.54 2.471 
Malaysia 0.0009 2 1 6.21 3.67 36.95 35.78 51.21 191.51 3.27 4.98 2.92 46.77 2.754 
Mexico 0.0089 1 0 5.35 7.26 38.97 38.38 35.71 54.33 3.42 4.11 0.73 28.33 2.142 
Peru 0.0002 4 1 7.63 4.52 31.58 39.06 71.24 43.06 2.75 5.17 4.00 47.15 2.517 
Philippines 0.0003 2 0 6.26 5.35 35.77 29.84 88.02 89.85 2.73 2.66 3.32 48.26 2.033 
Poland 0.0005 3 1 5.97 7.47 36.19 36.48 NA 75.52 4.45 4.93 3.68 28.56 2.688 
Romania 0.0006 3 0 7.64 8.60 35.21 31.71 73.12 75.08 3.75 3.49 4.65 16.31 2.238 
Russia 0.0068 3 0 4.92 13.42 43.92 37.73 NA 55.18 4.29 2.66 3.77 61.59 1.725 
South Africa 0.0009 2 0 4.78 10.35 25.91 35.07 68.54 59.34 2.72 4.84 1.67 76.32 2.671 
31 
 
Thailand 0.0005 3 1 5.83 4.16 33.74 34.24 53.14 135.01 3.17 2.96 3.46 62.06 1.742 
Turkey 
 
Mean 
0.0006 
 
0.0002 
4 
 
2.7 
1 
 
0.6 
5.44 
 
6.04 
15.32 
 
7.96 
32.02 
 
34.04 
32.59 
 
35.49 
51.52 
 
60.87 
49.15 
 
76.95 
4.56 
 
3.71 
5.26 
 
3.39 
3.66 
 
3.43 
28.94 
 
46.32 
2.392 
 
2.434 
Overall: 
Mean 0.0233 2.8 0.7 4.62 5.93 34.07 36.79 44.37 84.09 4.46 4.32 2.15 72.84 3.345 
Median 0.0062 3 1 4.74 5.24 33.65 36.12 39.22 69.77 4.64 5.02 1.57 55.67 3.192 
Std Dev 0.426 0.7 0.5 1.87 3.26 5.75 4.69 16.88 57.29 1.03 1.93 1.79 66.60 1.145 
Minimum 0.0002 1 0 0.65 2.24 24.27 27.80 19.38 25.46 2.33 -1.81 -0.41 16.31 1.725 
Maximum 0.2259 4 1 9.59 15.32 46.50 45.22 88.02 362.90 3.75 6.71 9.07 421.17 5.552 
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Table 2 Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variables 
 
Note: Port_Alloc is portfolio allocation which is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡); SITL is stringent 
insider trading laws index that ranges between 1 (least stringent) and 4 (most stringent); Enforce is the enforcement of insider trading law which is a dummy variable equal to 
one if insider trading has been enforced at least once by 2000, and zero otherwise; EHBIAS is equity home bias and is calculated as the log value of the share of domestic 
investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative to the country's world market capitalization weight; REFER is the three year moving average standard 
deviation of weighted real effective foreign exchange rate; FinRisk is the financial risk rating index of a country; EconRisk represents the economic risk rating index of a 
country; TRCT is the measure of average transaction cost in basis points and is divided by 100; LSMI is a measure of market integration measured as the ratio of a country's 
annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; Law represents the rule of law rating index of a country; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities 
plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of corporate assets of country  𝑖; GDPPCG is gross domestic product per capita growth rate; MGDP is market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP; Cor corruption level prevailing in the country. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
  Port_Alloc SITL Enforce EHBIAS REFER FinRisk EconRisk TRCT LSMI Law Tobinq GDPPCG MGDP Cor 
Port_Alloc  1              
SITL 0.12 1             
Enforce  0.37* 0.23* 1            
EHBIAS  -0.65* -0.38* -0.28* 1           
REFER  -0.12* -0.08 -0.06* -0.11 1          
FinRisk  -0.13* -0.06 -0.13* -0.03 -0.08 1         
EconRisk  -0.14* -0.14 0.21* -0.17* -0.05 0.04 1        
TRCT  -0.21* 0.02 0.14* -0.28* -0.11 0.11* 0.21* 1       
LSMI  0.25* -0.15* -0.03 -0.16* -0.06 -0.02 -0.27* -0.28* 1      
Law  0.20* 0.08 0.12* -0.29* 0.04 0.09* 0.17* 0.33* 0.19* 1     
Tobinq  0.23* -0.09* -0.10* -0.21* 0.04 0.03 0.10* 0.29* -0.06 0.17* 1    
GDPPCG  0.38* 0.18* 0.31* -0.51* -0.06 -0.02 -0.27* -0.27* 0.14* 0.36 0.35* 1   
MGDP  0.16* 0.12* 0.18* -0.41* -0.06 -0.08 -0.22* -0.18* 0.32* 0.10* 0.08 0.29* 1  
Cor  -0.25* 0.10* 0.22* -0.34* -0.08 -0.04 -0.19* -0.08* 0.18* -0.34* -0.32* -0.34* -0.22* 1 
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Table 3 Effects of insider trading laws and enforcement on international equity portfolio 
investment 
 
This table reports the results from the regression of insider trading laws and enforcement in a country from 2001 
to 2015. In all regressions the dependent variable is portfolio allocation which is the log value of country wise 
bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). The explanatory variables of 
key interest are SITL and Enforce as defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are as described in 
Table 1. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the 
statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. For models 1 and 3 
estimations, please see equation (2), and for models 2 and 4 estimations, please see equation (3) in the text. 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
SITL  0.194**  0.177**  
 (2.15)  (2.06)  
Enforce  0.819***  0.612*** 
  (9.74)  (7.63) 
EHBIAS   -0.149*** -0.126*** 
   (-6.13) (-5.41) 
REFER -0.176*** -0.135*** -0.182*** -0.128*** 
 (-3.37) (-2.97) (-3.47) (-3.04) 
FinRisk -0.362** -0.383** -0.423*** -0.456** 
 -2.11) (-2.06) (-2.59) (-2.38) 
EconRisk -0.718*** -0.775** -0.731** -0.852** 
 (-2.95) (-2.03) (-2.19) (-2.40) 
TRCT -0.287*** -0.365*** -0.326** -0.495*** 
 (-2.85) (-3.97) (-2.13) (-2.58) 
LSMI 0.206*** 0.197*** 0.506*** 0.539*** 
 (3.44) (3.34) (3.19) (3.17) 
Law 0.145** 0.277* 0.638** 0.483** 
 (2.10) (1.85) (2.24) (2.29) 
Tobinq 0.406*** 0.377*** 0.285*** 0.270** 
 (4.18) (3.22) (2.72) (2.38) 
GDPPCG 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.583** 0.605** 
 (4.24) (4.10) (2.16) (2.42) 
MGDP 0.617** 0.604** 0.618*** 0.472*** 
 (2.29) (2.25) (2.57) (2.81) 
Cor -0.640*** -0.694*** -0.412*** -0.536*** 
 (-4.23) (-4.67) (-3.02) (-3.43) 
Constant 0.734*** 0.952*** 0.325*** 0.496* 
 (2.63) (3.38) (3.37) (1.88) 
Number of Observations 615 615 615 615 
Adj. R-square 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 
Country fixed effects 
Year fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 4 Insider trading law enforcement, institutional quality, stock market development and 
international equity portfolio investment 
 
This table reports the results from the regression of enforcement in a country from 2001 to 2015. For models 1-2 and 3-4 
specification (please see equations 4 and 5 respectively in the text). The dependent variable is the portfolio allocation by 
foreign investors. The explanatory variable of key interest is Enforce as defined in the notes to Table 1. WBGI and InvPro are 
proxies for a country’s infrastructure. WBGI is World Bank Governance Indicator of good governance. InvPro is investor 
protection measure from International Country Risk Guide. TRGDP and Turn are proxies for the level of a country’s stock 
market development. TRGDP is stock value traded scaled by GDP. Turn is turnover ratio which is the market capitalization 
scaled by GDP. The interaction of the coefficient Enforce tests whether the impact of enforcement of insider trading laws on 
foreign equity flow varies depending on a country’s institutional quality and the level of the country’s stock market 
development. All the control variables are as described in Table 1. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on 
Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients 
are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance 
levels. 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Enforce 0.236*** 0.263*** 0.358*** 0.470*** 
 (2.96) (3.02) (3.74) (3.81) 
WBGI 0.279***    
 (2.68)    
Enforce×WBGI 0.882***    
 (4.12)    
InvPro 
 
Enforce×InvPro 
 
TRGDP 
 
Enforce×TRGDP 
 
Turn 
 
Enforce×Turn 
 
EHBIAS 
 
REFER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.146*** 
(-7.53) 
-0.819** 
0.154** 
(2.38) 
0.490*** 
(5.87) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.198*** 
(-8.25) 
-0.933** 
 
 
 
 
0.383*** 
(3.91) 
0.577*** 
(3.46) 
 
 
 
 
-0.270*** 
(-10.37) 
-0.596** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.578*** 
(3.95) 
0.228*** 
(5.07) 
-0.285*** 
(-10.64) 
-0.827** 
 (-2.16) (-2.24) (-2.18) (-2.14) 
FinRisk -0.461*** -0.457*** -0.189* -0.632*** 
 (-2.64) (-2.62) (-1.73) (-3.74) 
EconRisk -0.892*** -0.930*** -0.405** -0.961*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.91) (-2.47) (-4.33) 
PolRisk -0.446 -0.889*** -0.925*** -0.894*** 
 (-1.32) (-2.58) (-4.27) (-2.96) 
LSMI 0.197*** 0.233*** 0.768*** 0.255*** 
 (5.78) (6.46) (3.62) (7.59) 
Law 0.765 0.528 0.183 0.208 
 (0.46) (0.13) (1.21) (1.02) 
Tobinq 0.130 0.107 0.156 0.114 
 (1.39) (1.22) (0.20) (1.28) 
GDPPCG 0.123*** 0.127*** 0.918*** 0.102*** 
 (6.97) (6.11) (5.85) (4.94) 
Cor -0.753*** -0.887*** -0.838*** -0.911*** 
 
Marginal Effects 
(-2.94) 
0.472 
(-3.47) 
0.268 
(-4.96) 
0.236 
(-3.75) 
0.354 
Constant 0.125*** 0.105*** -0.063 0.113*** 
 (4.97) (3.06) (-0.37) (4.28) 
Number of observations 
Adj.R-square 
Country fixed effects 
Year fixed effects 
660 
0.37 
Yes 
Yes 
660 
0.36 
Yes 
Yes 
660 
0.34 
Yes 
Yes 
660 
0.40 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 5 Dynamic GMM 
 
This table reports the results from the regression of stringent insider trading laws and enforcement in a country 
from 2001 to 2015. In all regressions the dependent variable is portfolio allocation Port_Alloc which is the log 
value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡).The 
explanatory variables of key interest are SITL and Enforce as defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control 
variables are as described in Table 1. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on Newey-West 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients 
are reported as partial elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
significance levels. 
 
Developed Markets    Emerging Markets 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
SITL  0.267***  0.185**  
 (2.81)  (2.11)  
Enforce  0.276***  0.172** 
  (4.79)  (2.07) 
EHBIAS -0.178*** -0.213*** -0.322*** -0.304*** 
 (-8.26) (-9.26) (-11.93) (-11.86) 
REFER -0.212** -0.174* -0.318** -0.213*** 
 (-2.26) (-1.89) (-2.09) (-2.78) 
FinRisk -0.838*** -0.797*** -0.373** -0.386*** 
 (-3.46) (-2.62) (-2.25) (-2.57) 
EconRisk -0.663** -0.631* -0.251* -0.260* 
 (-2.28) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-1.77) 
TRCT -0.159*** -0.114** -0.197*** -0.217*** 
 (-3.52) (-2.09) (-5.35) (-5.84) 
LSMI 0.504*** 0.458*** 0.141*** 0.165*** 
 (7.75) (7.30) (3.98) (4.35) 
Law 0.262 0.209 0.194 0.216 
 (0.57) (0.36) (1.17) (1.59) 
Tobinq 0.638*** 0.582** 0.184* 0.230** 
 (3.01) (2.35) (1.82) (2.08) 
GDPPCG 0.141*** 0.107*** 0.429*** 0.465*** 
 (4.50) (3.76) (6.32) (6.67) 
MGDP 0.317*** 0.288*** 0.354*** 0.387*** 
 (4.63) (3.91) (3.32) (3.66) 
Cor -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.530*** -0.563*** 
 (-4.38) (-3.87) (-2.59) (-2.90) 
AR (2) 
Hansen J statistics 
Difference Hansen J statistics 
0.59 
0.63 
0.75 
0.70 
0.67 
0.79 
0.66 
0.59 
0.77 
0.85 
0.74 
0.66 
Country fixed effects 
Year fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
36 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Definitions of variables 
Variable  Description 
Portfolio allocation Port_Alloc The log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). 
Stringent insider trading laws SITL An index that ranges between 1 (least stringent) and 4 (most stringent) and is the aggregate of four elements: Laws 
forbidding insiders from trading on price-sensitive private information, the country’s regulations forbidding tippees 
from using the price-sensitive private information provided by corporate insiders, financial penalty suffered for 
violating insider trading laws, if insider trading is considered as a criminal offence. 
Enforcement Enforce A dummy variable which is equal to one if insider trading laws have once been enforced in a country by the year 
2000, and zero otherwise. 
Equity home bias EHBIAS The log value of the share of domestic investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (l) relative to the 
country's world market capitalization weight. 
Real effective foreign exchange rate REFER The three year moving average standard deviation of weighted real effective foreign exchange rate. 
Financial risk FinRisk The financial risk rating index of a country from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Economic risk EconRisk The economic risk rating index of a country from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Political risk PolRisk The political risk rating index of a country from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Transaction cost TRCT The average transaction cost in basis points which is divided by 100. 
Log stock market integration LSMI The ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP. 
Law Law The rule of law rating index of a country. 
Tobinq Tobinq The log (natural) book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of 
corporate assets of country. 
GDP per capita growth  GDPPCG The gross domestic product per capita growth rate. 
Market capitalisation to GDP MGDP The market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. 
Corruption Cor Corruption level prevailing in the country 
World bank governance indicators WBGI The investor protection measure obtained from the World Bank Governance Indicator of good governance. 
Investor protection InvPro The investor protection measure obtained from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Equity value traded scaled by GDP TRGDP The equity value traded scaled by GDP. 
Turnover ratio Turn The total value of equity traded scaled by market capitalization. 
 
